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Templates for Trade
Change, Persistence and Path Dependence in U. S. and EU 
Preferential Trade Agreements
Ali Arbia
Abstract
Over the last two decades, Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) proliferated through the international 
trading system. PTAs created a web of rules paralleling and extending the system of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). PTAs are an increasingly dominant feature of the international trading system, add-
ing to a steadily increasing complexity. Their content is rarely studied systematically across agreements, 
and the mechanisms leading to their genesis are little understood. It is typically assumed that actors like 
the European Union (EU) and the United States (U. S.) work off a template when negotiating PTAs. Some 
argue that this allows them, amongst others, to impose a regulatory regime. This working paper attempts 
to put this claim to the test. Using diffusion theory as framework, it analyzes PTAs signed by the EU, the U. 
S. and their regional trading partners. Understanding the use of templates will help negotiating parties to 
assess the margin of maneuver when negotiating PTAs with the EU and the U. S. as well as the rigidity of 
their mandate. The analysis is conducted on a regional and a domestic level using aggregated data on PTA 
content and a qualitative assessment of selected PTA provisions (anti-corruption, environment and cultural 
cooperation). The study finds that the flexibility of these mandates is considerable and that templates, if 
used at all, can change substantially over time.
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1. Introduction1
Since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, international trade relations became 
dominated by a new phenomenon: the rise of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). PTAs have become 
a dominant element of the international trading system and their number is steadily increasing. The WTO 
lists 379 PTAs in force in 2013.2 These agreements have fundamentally altered the international trade 
regime. For years, there has been a debate raging amongst economists if PTAs constitute “building blocks” 
(Baldwin 1993, 1997, 2006; Baldwin/Thornton 2008) or “stumbling blocks” (Bhagwati 1991, 1996; Bhagwati/
Pangariya 1996; Bhagwati et al. 1998; Bhagwati et al. 1999) on the way to true trade liberalization. The dust 
kicked up by this controversy has often clouded other more immediate issues in relation to PTAs.
PTAs create a very complex, multi-layered web of rules, regulations, and tariffs. These complexities and 
their roots are little understood. The focus of most studies is determined by relatively narrow disciplin-
ary boundaries. Economists focus on evaluating the trade impact of PTAs and if they are a hindrance or a 
boon to trade liberalization. Legal experts typically concentrate on specific agreements, clauses and rulings. 
There are almost no studies looking at the content of PTAs on an aggregated level. Few studies look at ‘how 
the sausages are made’ and if they do, they are almost exclusively case studies of a single specific agree-
ment or negotiation process.
In this working paper, I explore one way to fill this gap. It is often argued that actors follow templates when 
negotiating PTAs (Baldwin 2006: 1469; Baldwin/Thornton 2008: 49; Destler 2007: 7; Weintraub 2004: 89) or 
that newer agreements are based on templates of previous ones (Davis 2009: 27). Focusing on the nature 
of these templates offers a way to study the persistence and flexibility of PTA content from one agreement 
to the next. This, in turn, will shed some light on how much of these agreements stems from purely rational 
design (based on their economic purpose) and to which extent factors like path dependency come into 
play. I conduct an aggregated analysis of PTA content and of selected provisions of the two biggest actors in 
global trade and their regional partners. The analysis is situated on a global, regional and domestic level.
Before we begin, the nomenclature has to be clarified in order to avoid misunderstandings. There is a 
certain level of confusion on how to label these agreements and how to distinguish between Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA), Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) or Regional Trade Agreements (RTA). The WTO 
uses RTA as an umbrella term and distinguishes between PTAs (i.e., agreements signed under the so-called 
enabling clause) and FTAs. In the literature different terms are used. 
As RTAs become more frequently cross-regional, the geographic definition has increasingly lost its rationale. 
Thus the WTO’s ’R’ for ’Regional’ in RTA becomes almost nonsensical. In this working paper, I will therefore 
follow the common practice in academic literature to label all agreements as “preferential,” distinguishing 
among them between regular FTAs and Customs Unions (CU). It is important to note that the term ‘prefer-
ential’ is not intended to be normative, but simply reflects the fact that these agreements usually offer a 
preferential market access to a specific trading partner.
1 This Working Paper is to a large extent based on the research I conducted as a Fellow at the Kolleg-Forschergruppe 
“The Transformative Power of Europe” (KFG). I owe thanks to my colleagues at the KFG for many insightful com-
ments throughout the various stages of the manuscript. All remaining errors are entirely my own.
2 WTO website, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicsummarytable.aspx, retrieved 15 July 2013.
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2. Colliding Templates: Change and Persistence
2.1 Templates and Diffusion
The generation of PTAs’ content is rarely studied. Typically, a functional view is adopted and little atten-
tion is given to other possibilities. At the same time, the claim that signatories of PTAs follow a national 
template is very common among practitioners and scholars. To analyze the use and spread of templates, I 
will use some of the existing literature on PTAs. In view of the abundant literature on the topic, I will focus 
on studies at the aggregated level on the one hand. On the other hand, I will use diffusion as an analytical 
framework. The latter promises to illuminate the issue from a new angle.
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett observe that “[i]nternational policy diffusion occurs when government policy 
decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries” 
(2006: 787). We can expect policy diffusion in cases where templates are used in PTA negotiations. The 
rapid rise of PTAs per se could already be considered a form of diffusion because “[d]iffusion research is 
motivated by the observation that nation-states, or some other jurisdictional unit, choose similar institu-
tions within a fairly circumscribed period of time” (Elkins/Simmons 2005: 34). Elkins and Simmons see a 
need for bringing in the international level when studying the diffusion of policy choices (2004: 187). The 
international trading system and the WTO are interesting cases to do so.
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett identify four distinct mechanisms of diffusion: coercion, competition, learn-
ing and emulation (2006: 782). All four are plausible mechanisms when it comes to trade agreements. 
Although I will come back to this, I am not primarily interested in the precise role played by the various 
mechanisms in this working paper. Its focus rather lies on the extent to which specific ideas can be tracked 
across PTAs. Diffusion can be studied as a process, but also as an outcome (Elkins/Simmons 2005: 37) what 
this working paper will do: Can we observe diffusion as an outcome in PTA provisions?
Börzel and Risse define diffusion in a similar, though slightly more general way as a “process through which 
ideas are spread across time and space” (Börzel/Risse 2009: 5; based on Strang/Meyer 1993). This is a good 
starting point for this study as the concept of templates fits perfectly into this definition. I will look at the 
establishing process of PTAs across time but also across geographic areas. Although the change from one 
agreement to the next typically would not be considered as a form of diffusion, it still merits attention, as 
these are the rules that will diffuse across borders at a later stage.
There is some literature touching upon diffusion, specifically in the realm of the global economy. Simmons 
and Elkins look at policy diffusion in international political economy. Their focus is relatively abstract and 
serves as a starting point for more specific studies of diffusion in trade. Their point of departure are the 
shortcomings of purely domestic explanations when studying globalization of liberalization. “Temporal and 
regional clustering” leads to the conclusion that “something systematic must be driving states’ policies” 
(2004: 186). Unlike this working paper, they use PTAs as explanatory variables among others.
Some authors make an argument based on diffusion by competition without adopting an explicit diffu-
sion frame. Among these authors is the economist Richard Baldwin, whose “Domino Theory” could be 
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considered a form of diffusion by competition (Baldwin 1993, 2006; Baldwin/Jaimovich 2010; Baldwin/
Thornton 2008). He argues that an initial shock sets a process in motion that motivates previously indiffer-
ent actors on the outside to push for additional trade liberalization. For the Americas, Baldwin argues, this 
event was the conclusion of the Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (MUSFTA), and for Europe the comple-
tion of the Single Market (Baldwin 1997: 27, 2006: 1482). According to this argument, competition leads to 
the horizontal adoption of provisions from the template.
In a similar vein, but based on a political and not economic logic, Ravenhill writes of a “political domino 
effect” (2010). Drezner studied “globalization and policy convergence” (2001). If PTAs are indeed not inde-
pendent of each other in such ways (i.e., domino effect and/or convergence), we can logically expect PTAs 
to show some consistency over time and within regional clusters in both cases, a tell-tale sign of diffusion.
Finally, there is a small number of studies about PTAs and specific diffusion effects. They appear to treat 
specific questions (e.g., North-South relations) or limited geographic areas (e.g., “Pacific Rim”) and are, 
therefore, only of limited value for this study (see for example Manger 2009; Nakagawa 2009). However, all 
of them share the assumption that a template exists at some point in time.
The claim that countries use a template when negotiating trade agreements is common in the literature on 
PTAs (Baldwin 2006: 1469). Several interviewees from the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) have mentioned the U.S. template. Negotiators of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as-
serted the same (author’s interviews Washington DC 2009, Geneva and Bern 20103). The USTR itself men-
tions a template in some documents (for example in USTR 2007). Some authors argue that there are geo-
graphical clusters that follow (or should follow) a regional template (Baldwin/Thornton 2008: 49). There is 
no consensus on/about how modifiable this template is and when or how often it changes. Some see it as 
almost immutable (author’s interviews Washington DC 20094), others link it to specific agreements (e.g., 
Weintraub (2004: 89) names Singapore and Chile; Singapore was also mentioned in author’s interview 
Washington DC 2009), and some others think change is instigated by domestic politics (Destler 2007: 7; 
USTR 2007). The minimalist view in contrast to assuming templates to be almost immutable is that “[e]
ach PTA acts as a template for future agreements - indeed, there is considerable path dependency as most 
agreements closely follow the text of previous agreements” (Davis 2009: 27).
In the literature, there are few examples of authors trying to study rules laid down in PTAs on an aggregate 
level. One attempt to do so is a 2012 article by Raymond Hicks and Soo Yeon Kim. They studied PTAs in 
Asia basing their analysis on the concept of credible commitment. The other notable exception is an article 
published by a legal scholar and two economists on the “Anatomy of EU and U.S. preferential trade agree-
ments” (Horn et al. 2010). Their approach will be instrumental in this paper, not at least because of their 
case selection.
3 Unstructured interviews with former US trade negotiators and high ranking trade officials in Washington DC on 10, 
12, 16 and 23 November 2009, with EFTA negotiators in Geneva on 3 June and 3 May 2010 and with high ranking 
Swiss trade officials in Bern 2 and 8 June 2010.
4 Unstructured interviews with former US trade negotiators 4 November 2009 and an USTR official 24 November 
2009 in Washington DC.
8 | KFG Working Paper No. 51 | September 2013 
Here lies the potential for an important contribution by political science to research in law and economics 
on PTAs. John Ravenhill, for example, questions that the main driving force behind PTAs is primarily an 
economic rationale. In a case study on the “New East Asian Regionalism,” he challenges the idea that the 
New Regionalism is a response to greater interdependencies: most agreements in East Asia are concluded 
outside the region (2010: 185). Therefore, he argues that it is hard to see why states would not push 
for multilateral liberalization, if domestic lobbying was at the source of the search for new markets. For 
businesses, the cost of compliance is often superior to the benefits of these agreements (Ravenhill 2010: 
200). The same observation about the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s (APEC) PTAs is made by Cédric 
Dupont and David Huang (2008: 116).
If the signing of such agreements is not driven by an economic logic in the first place, if they are not a 
result of rational design, the question arises how this is reflected in their content. If concluding PTAs is 
more about political and diplomatic goodwill on the international scene than about opening markets for 
domestic actors, the political economy of PTAs might be very different from what is usually assumed. If 
these agreements follow a political rationale and their existence per se is more important than their actual 
content, the way we study the latter needs to be re-thought.
I assume the existence of some sort of template as a starting point of this study. I will verify if this claim is 
correct and if there is a measurable effect that can be observed. If the template hypothesis is confirmed, 
the next question is how templates are used (if at all). How often and how easily are these templates modi-
fied and under what circumstances can we observe changes? I will use the ’template’ concept in the largest 
possible sense for this study in order to cover the different ways it can be conceptualized. The meaning of 
’template’ can be situated anywhere on the spectrum from an almost immutable ‘ready-made’ treaty to 
the idea that every agreement is loosely based on a previous one as a template (Davis 2009: 27).
There is an analytical problem that needs to be addressed first. If all negotiating parties use their own 
template and we assume them to be rigid, then the conclusion of an agreement would obviously be very 
unlikely – except in cases of an almost perfect match of preferences. I suggest to understand the process 
similar to the ones guiding the laws of Mendelian inheritance: If a new PTA is negotiated, the negotiation 
mandate is at least in parts based on this country’s previous agreements (Arbia 2011; Davis 2009: 27; 
Weintraub 2004: 89). Like chromosomes, ’PTA DNA’ will recombine. Analogously to the aforementioned 
laws of inheritance, some of these provisions will be ‘dominant.’ Powerful countries will impose certain 
provisions and preferences based on their template. Weaker parties might insist on some and try to com-
promise on others. Some provisions will be ’recessive.’ They will not be part of the final agreement because 
they are not accepted by the other party or have to be traded in for another preference. Finally, some 
provisions will merge and represent aspects of the preferences of each of the two parties (or, to stick with 
the metaphor, ‘parents’). They will show characteristics of ancestor agreements of all parties involved.
2.2  Templates and Global Trends
Why should we be interested in the global dynamic of PTAs? My argument for relevance rests on the fact 
that PTAs are not only an increasingly dominant element of international trade relations, but also that they 
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create an environment that frequently overwhelms the capacities of most, if not all, actors. It is therefore 
crucial to understand how this situation came about. Studying the role of templates in the genesis of this 
system is a way to start studying the phenomenon. In this subsection, I will investigate if there is evidence 
for the use of templates on a global level. For this purpose, some general trends of the PTA frenzy of the 
last two decades have to be reviewed.
Fiorentino, Verdeja and Toqueboeuf observe what they call an “increasing level of sophistication” (2007: 2) 
of PTAs. A proxy measure confirming this empirically is the length of PTAs. Figure 1 shows the development 
of the mean number of words for all agreements signed by the top eight PTAs signatories until 2011.5 There 
is a clear upward trend and also evidence that the scope is broadening (Arbia 2011; Horn et al. 2010) what 
is overall consistent with the use of templates. These templates seem to be extended regularly, but rarely 
or never reduced. Amending them appears to be a one way street.
Figure 1: Mean Total Words in PTAs
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Source: author’s own research.
5 For its compilation, the same database was used on which the results presented later in this section are based 
upon. For details see Arbia 2011.
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Another noteworthy aspect is that there is hardly ever an agreement that is cancelled. All the rules, regula-
tions and norms that are put into place with its ratification continue to exist. While the number of agree-
ments is growing, a typical current agreement is increasingly longer, more sophisticated, and includes a 
broader agenda than older ones. This is consistent with Davis’ view that every agreement serves as tem-
plate for the next one (2009: 27), with the caveat that they are only extended. It also appears consistent 
with what we would expect from a diffusion phenomenon. If there is indeed such a horizontal use of tem-
plates, these effects might reinforce each other. The consequence of this dynamic is illustrated by Figure 
2 showing the accumulated total number of words of all PTAs signed by the top eight signatories in force. 
All these words represent some form of obligation, a point of reference and a specific aspect of a trade 
relationship between two countries. All these rules stack up and affect the system. The use of templates 
could be a possible explanation for this quasi exponential trend.
Figure 2: Accumulation of PTA Legalization
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Source: author’s own research.
The challenge lies in analyzing how flexible these templates are and what role they play exactly in PTA cre-
ation. This will contribute to existing research in three ways: First, it will allow rendering some previously 
obscured mechanisms of PTA genesis visible. How many of the negotiated rules are created sui generis 
in contrast to the number of more or less set rules? Second, by focusing on templates, a comparison of 
different countries and PTAs on an aggregated level becomes possible. Third, a better understanding of 
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how provisions and topics in PTAs ’jump’ from one agreement to another (horizontally and vertically) will 
add a detailed study of PTAs to the literature on diffusion. This will allow for a better understanding of the 
systemic, regional and domestic impact these dynamics have on the international trading system.
2.3  The World Trade Organization
There is an aspect on the international level that merits specific attention. In contrast to the domestic tem-
plate hypothesis, the WTO is an international organization that preceded the PTA explosion and that might 
influence PTAs similar to a template on a multilateral level. But before reviewing the evidence, we need to 
briefly clarify the legal and economic interconnections between the WTO and PTAs, the multilateral and 
the bi- or plurilateral ways of trade liberalization.
From an economist’s and a purely theoretical perspective, global free trade is always a superior solution 
to only regional free trade (except for few very specific circumstances). Bi- or plurilateral agreements are 
suboptimal outcomes in this view. Within this debate, a fundamental disagreement concerning the as-
sessment of the dynamic developing from this ‘inferior’ PTA solution and its significance for future trade 
regimes exists: On the one side, PTAs are regarded as conflicting with the goal of global elimination of trade 
barriers. On the other side, PTAs are believed to be complementary and a welcome intermediate step to 
global free trade.
When the WTO agreements were negotiated, the state parties were very well aware of this tension be-
tween multilateral trade liberalization and regional trade agreements. However, the legal context is not 
entirely clear and many experts assume that at least some PTAs are illegal under WTO rules. But all member 
states have signed PTAs (or are at least negotiating PTAs) and, therefore, everyone prefers to let sleeping 
dogs lie. The WTO’s Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) is responsible for reviewing the 
compatibility of PTAs with the WTO treaty, but for political reasons it never functioned as intended. Within 
the WTO framework, PTAs are supposed to be an exception and not the rule. In theory, PTAs are seen as a 
departure from core principles of the WTO and are therefore only permitted under specific circumstances. 
An exemption must be requested and justified under one of three clauses of the treaty. These are Article 
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for agreements covering trade in goods, Article 
V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) for services, and the so called Enabling Clause, 
which serves as an exemption for non-reciprocal agreements with developing countries.
Independently from how legal experts position themselves vis-à-vis the question of legality of PTAs, few 
would contest that the rules in PTAs are closely linked to trade rules established by the WTO. This way, the 
WTO indeed affects the design of PTAs. I stipulate three main ways how the WTO shapes PTAs and the 
legal regime that comes with them: First, it provides legal limits (e.g., comprehensiveness, “substantially 
all trade”). Second, the WTO acts as a model (e.g., Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), Harmonization, 
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT)). Third, it provides a point of reference for new agreements (e.g., no-contradiction, 
other agreements). None of these factors will prevent a state from using templates. Nevertheless, they are 
intervening variables that might shape or alter a template.
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A good proxy measure for the existence of this connection is to verify how the WTO is referenced in PTAs. 
Almost all agreements make explicit references to the WTO. The number of references has been increasing 
over time and growing with the number of agreements (see figure 3 for the top ten signatories). In addition, 
these agreements typically have an introductory WTO disclaimer, in which the parties reaffirm their “rights 
and obligations under the WTO agreement” and that nothing in the treaty should “impair their WTO/GATT 
obligations.” Only 14 out of 102 agreements by the top eight signatories (7.5 per cent) did not have such 
a “disclaimer” and 5 out of the 14 went into force before 1990 (Arbia 2011). Today, such clauses seem to 
be standard practice and are omnipresent in PTAs. Clearly, the WTO is a legal point of reference. Although 
there is a dispute to which extent PTAs are compatible with WTO rules, trade negotiators make an undeni-
able effort to render them at least partially compatible with the WTO agreements.
Figure 3: GATT and WTO References
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Source: author’s own research.
On the systemic level, we see that the typical PTA appears to follow some pattern of development consis-
tent with the idea of templates being used: it gets longer and broader over time. This is consistent with 
the minimal definition of templates by Davis presented earlier in this paper. The WTO is an intervening 
variable with some (but probably little) influence on the domestic templates. However, it is indeed a point 
of reference that is likely to influence the design of the templates. This shows that PTAs cannot be studied 
in isolation. In the following sections, I will deepen the analysis by narrowing the view from the system to 
the regional and, later, domestic level.
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3.  Data and Method
The research question of this paper is how templates for PTAs are used and how they are modified (if at 
all). After having discussed the systemic level in the previous section, I will move one level down. The focus 
of this section will be on what I earlier called the horizontal use of templates in PTAs, corresponding to a 
standard diffusion argument. Before I begin with the analysis, I will first give some indications about the 
data and the method used. I will also discuss the case selection and its limits.
To make sure that the patterns detected can be really traced back to a template of one actor, I will focus on 
the EU and the U.S. It is quite safe to assume that these two actors are most likely able to impose such a 
template on other trading partners because of their size and market power. Almost independently of which 
diffusion mechanism we are looking at, they are likely to be a starting point. Some authors have gone so far 
as to claim that the EU and the U.S. are explicitly trying to impose a regulatory regime (Horn et al. 2010) or 
at least that they are setting up a hub and spoke system with themselves at the center (Augier et al. 2005: 
578; Baldwin 2006: 1483; Baldwin/Thornton 2008: 9; UNDP 2007: 152).
My assumption is that the EU and the U.S. work from a template while negotiating PTAs. This template is 
imposed on their trading partners. I use the term ‘imposed’ loosely in the sense of some form of transmis-
sion including those described in the diffusion literature (coercion, competition, learning or emulation; 
Simmons et al. 2006: 782). The precise nature of the mechanism is secondary for this study because I 
am interested in the outcome and not the specific mechanism of transmission. Due to the overwhelming 
economic power of the U.S. and the EU it is plausible that these two actors are using coercion as one of the 
tools. Competition is likely to be another factor as third countries struggle to remain economically attrac-
tive by adopting the regulations of the biggest markets, which in turn creates a self-reinforcing feedback 
loop the more countries adopt these standards. With the EU and the U.S. dominating the world of interna-
tional trade, simple emulation is another plausible mechanism. To a lesser extent, we might observe some 
learning effects, even though the EU and the U.S. would not be at a particular advantage there. If they 
manage to lead the way, then it is reasonable to expect their trading partners to use the same rules when 
signing their own PTAs with third parties. Therefore, I will compare PTAs signed by selected regional actors 
and PTAs signed by the EU and the U.S..
The U.S. and the EU are obviously not the only ones signing PTAs despite their central role in PTA prolifera-
tion. The EU has notified 37 agreements that are in force, EFTA 21, and the U.S. 17. In 2007 and according 
to the WTO, these three combined represented more than 70 per cent of all agreements signed among 
countries from the North and the existing North-South agreements. According to the same figures, 29.7 
per cent were signed by the EU, 23.4 per cent by the EFTA, and 17.0 per cent by the U.S.. Obviously, this 
also reflects their market size.
To analyze the horizontal use of a template, I will compare a subset of actors in two separate regions. One 
region is formed by the EU and EFTA, the other ‘region’ consists of the U.S., Mexico and Chile. Although the 
first pairing covers a big part of a whole continent and a geographically contiguous area, I am aware that 
the second one does not. Nevertheless, I have chosen these two countries as, on the one hand, Mexico has 
a very close and early ties with the U.S. through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), while, 
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on the other, Chile is likely to be more peripheral. Thus, it will act as a form of control case. The absence 
of Canada in the analysis is due to the lack of available data. Canada is not as fervent a signer of PTAs as 
the other three countries. In addition, it has signed agreements with Chile, EFTA and the U.S. and is conse-
quently represented indirectly in the data analyzed with several of its PTAs.
The case of EFTA is also difficult with its history reaching back to 1960 and its many mutations in member-
ship. Nevertheless, with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the EU in 1995, EFTA’s rump mem-
bership was in place. This coincides approximately with the beginning of the surge of PTAs and it seems to 
be an acceptable comparison in the end. However, the number of possible cases in Western and Central 
Europe are very limited anyway.
Figure 4: Intra- and Cross-Regional Agreements Analyzed Sample
USA
EU
EFTAChile
Mexico
Norway
Switzerland Iceland
Liechtenstein2 0 0 4
1 9 9 4
(NAFTA)
1 9 9 9
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 3
1994 (EEA)
2 0 0 2 -
1924 (CU)
2 0 0 1
 Source: author’s own research
Figure 4 shows all agreements signed by these five actors amongst themselves. One can see that the com-
plication of conflicting templates is evident, for example, in the case of Chile and Mexico. Both have signed 
agreements with the EU and EFTA at different points in time. The agreements I will analyze form a bigger set 
containing all agreements for these five countries (also with third parties) available from the WTO database 
as a point of departure. Table 1 shows a summary of the agreements in the sample. A detailed list can be 
found in the appendix.
The list of agreements used contains 86 PTAs signed by the EU (27), EFTA (22), the U.S. (12), Chile (14) and 
Mexico (11). The data are extracted from a database I created for a previous research project. The coding 
can be found in the appendix (additional details on the coding and methodology can be found in Arbia 
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2011). The overwhelming majority of all agreements were signed in 1995 or later. However, I also included 
older agreements if they were available and notified to the WTO.
Table 1 Agreements Included
notified not notified total
EU 26 1 27
Chile 12 2 14
EFTA 17 5 22
Mexico 9 2 11
United States 10 2 12
  Source: author’s own research.
I have hinted at some limitations due to particular circumstances. For some of the cases, they need to be 
emphasized again. On a general note, there is a problem of interconnectedness on a global level that can-
not be avoided. With PTAs being a global and universal phenomenon, there is no isolated test case avail-
able. In my set of cases, Chile and Mexico have signed PTAs with EFTA and the EU and are thus also under a 
transatlantic influence. In the case of Chile, the agreements with the EU and EFTA came about even earlier 
(2000 and 2001, respectively) than the one with the U.S. (2004). It is still reasonable to expect geographic 
proximity to foster closer ties. Mexico and Chile have a PTA dating back to 1999. All countries analyzed are 
founding members of the WTO and encountered each other for trade negotiations before. 
The timing of agreements might be a factor helping us to disentangle different PTAs and to distinguish 
phases of development. Such an undertaking faces two major problems: First, the duration from initiation 
to actual coming into force of PTAs varies greatly. This might distort such a distinction considerably. For this 
work, I follow common practices and use the date of entry into force. The second big challenge is that the 
number of agreements for a particular time period is very small, a problem that cannot be resolved. 
Two of the earlier agreements are NAFTA that links U.S. and Mexico, on the one hand, and the European 
Economic Area (EEA) on the other, which in turn connect several former and current EFTA members to the 
EU. The EEA entails stronger legal implications for its members than NAFTA. Not without reason the EEA 
was often considered as a ‘waiting room’ for EU membership as it imposes similar obligations as on its 
members (but gives them no political voice). This limits the observations that can be made when comparing 
EFTA to other agreements. All EFTA members except for Switzerland are members of the EEA. Switzerland 
has signed her own extensive association agreements with the EU. The links between the EU and EFTA are 
probably more ‘political’ in nature.
In addition, the EU and EFTA have a competitive relationship. Historically, EFTA was meant to be a counter-
project to the European Communities built around the UK. As far as PTAs are concerned, EFTA was pursuing 
a policy of following the EU’s agreements concerning content and the choice of partners for many years. 
Between 1999 and 2006, the EU had a de facto moratorium in place on bilateral negotiations (Elsig 2007a, 
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2007b; Evenett 2007; Meunier 2007). The EU took a stance in favor of the multilateral venue for interna-
tional trade relations. This allowed EFTA to become more independent in its choice of partners and the 
content of its agreements. 
As far as Chile and Mexico are concerned, they pursued very different policies of international trade liber-
alization. Both countries had faced severe economic shocks in the 1980s and conducted important trade 
policy reforms as a reaction to these crises (Sáez 2005: 8). They both switched from an import substitution 
strategy to an export-focused approach (Fischer/Meller 1999: 2). Although Chile has the reputation of hav-
ing opened up much faster and more thoroughly, its unilateral liberalization did not lead to as much trade 
openness as it is usually credited for (Fischer/Meller 1999: 12). While Chile completed many trade reforms 
already in 1979, Mexico maintained considerable levels of protection at least until 1985 (Bergoeing et al. 
2002: 10) and it only caught up economically with Chile in the mid-1990s (Bergoeing et al. 2002: 4). Chile 
is of special interest here since it pursued a policy of unilateral trade liberalization under the influence of 
a group of U.S. trained economists during the military rule (often colloquially referred to as the ’Chicago 
Boys’). This strongly limited Chile’s option for further liberalizations for the period we are interested in. 
For the comparison and analysis in this section, the point of departure will be the comparative study by 
Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir. In their article, they compare the content of PTAs signed by the U.S. and by the 
EU. First, I will look briefly at their findings. Then I will add to their analysis and expand the original question 
asked by the authors: To which extent do we see the same pattern reflected with trading partners of the 
two trade giants? If they use a template, we would expect to see similar patterns in PTAs of their regional 
competitors or trading partners.
In order to compare the results across regions, there is the need for some form of ‘calibration,’ an anchor 
which can be used to contrast the content of a series of PTAs that are heterogeneous in their content. 
Luckily, there is a point of reference which all the PTAs have and that intrinsically links them: the WTO 
agreements. In the following paragraphs, I will explain how I will use the WTO as a point of reference and 
how this approach can be grounded in existing research.
Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir have used the WTO as a point of reference in order to analyze the content of 
PTAs in their study. The relation to WTO rules is the center of gravity around which they build their analy-
sis. Their content analysis of PTAs covers 14 agreements signed by the EU and 14 U.S. agreements. They 
distinguish two different categories based on this WTO connection: One type of commitments is classified 
as WTO Plus (“obligations relating to policy areas that are already subject to some form of commitment in 
the WTO agreements”) and the other as WTO X (short for WTO Extra) topics (“an obligation in an area [...] 
relating to a policy instrument that has not previously been regulated by the WTO;” Horn et al. 2010: 1571). 
Their observations will form the bases for the explorations in this working paper.
They note several similarities and some differences between the PTAs of the EU and the U.S.. I want to 
underline three of them because of their relevance for this analysis. The first claim they make in their 
comparison is that the EU uses many more WTO X provisions than the U.S. (Horn et al. 2010: 1581). In 
other words, in a typical EU PTA one will find many more topics that are not covered by the WTO according 
to these authors. Second, they argue that WTO X provisions of EU agreements suffer from what they call 
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“legal inflation” (Horn et al. 2010: 1584). This applies for the agreements in the geographic vicinity of the EU 
(as one might argue a PTA with the EU is just a stepping stone for later membership) as well as agreements 
signed by the EU outside the continent (Horn et al. 2010: 1584). Third, once stripped of this “legal inflation,” 
the agreements appear to be very similar according to the authors. They speculate that the EU and the 
U.S. use these agreements “as a means of transferring [their] regulatory regimes [...] to other countries.” 
However, they admit that the evidence for this argument is ambiguous (Horn et al. 2010: 1585). 
Using the WTO as a point of reference will facilitate comparability and help to avoid some of the inherent 
problems when focusing solely on the two big players. It also provides us with a methodological shortcut 
for coding agreements for an automated search by distinguishing between WTO X and WTO Plus provisions 
(a list of the search terms can be found in the appendix). Armed with these definitions, we will be able 
to move to the next question. The insights from this section concerning WTO X and WTO Plus provisions 
should also pave the way to how to tackle the concept of vertical templates best later.
Using the topics Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir have identified as WTO Plus (deepening WTO agreements) 
and WTO X (extending WTO agreements), I ran this search on the 86 agreements with a content analysis 
software. This method is obviously less precise than the qualitative assessment by a trained trade lawyer 
as done by Mavroidis (the only lawyer among the three authors). It is also a slightly different measure as it 
reports the frequency of such provisions rather than a dichotomous variable signaling if a topic has been 
covered or not in the agreement. However, I re-ran the search verifying for the presence or absence of a 
topic and my results remained unchanged.
4. Horizontal Templates: A Tale of Two Regions
As mentioned, I expect the EU and the U.S. to be extensively more successful in passing on the ’genetics’ of 
their agreements due to their size and their preferences being ‘dominant.’ To assess horizontal templates, 
I will use the data in two different ways to begin with: First, I compare the agreements of the five countries 
across the board. Second, I will look at how these topic areas developed over time in the two regions and 
if there is a detectable pattern.
I start with a general summary of the various agreements of the EU, the U.S., EFTA, Chile and Mexico. In 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 we see two boxplots. One summarizes WTO X provisions (i.e., topics not covered by 
the WTO in the agreements) for the five countries. The second shows the same for WTO Plus areas (i.e., 
extensions of topics already part of the WTO agreements). As far as WTO Plus provisions are concerned, no 
meaningful pattern seems to emerge, neither intra- nor cross-regional. The WTO X plot is less straightfor-
ward. The three cases from the Americas all have a higher median of WTO X provisions. EFTA and the EU 
have a similar pattern.
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One could argue that in Figure 5 Chile seems to be a case that is situated somewhere in-between the EU 
and the U.S. pattern. This might be explained by the fact that Chile’s trade liberalization policy followed a 
special trajectory. This can also be detected in the WTO Plus plot. The very narrow band of WTO Plus con-
cessions and their low level is likely to be explained by the extensive unilateral trade liberalization that was 
pursued by Chile earlier. When negotiating with far less liberalized countries bilaterally or multilaterally in 
the WTO, Chile did not have much left to put on the negotiation table. In that view it seems plausible that 
there are only a few WTO Plus concessions that were left for Chile to agree upon in their PTA negotiations. 
This traditional trade openness and a greater geographic distance could also explain a higher level of au-
tonomy from PTA provisions emanating from the U.S.. Because we have only Mexico to compare to, this 
remains speculative.
Figure 5: WTO Plus Provision Overview
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Source: author’s own research.
This first en bloc view shows no indication of the systematic use of a generalized and fixed horizontal 
template for WTO Plus provisions and suggests some effects for WTO X provisions. However, what has 
been left out of this analysis is the temporal dimension. There is a good chance that a gradual change over 
time is obscured in the aggregated data. PTAs gradually increase in legal density, complexity and issue 
areas covered (Arbia 2011). Newly introduced topics typically re-appear in subsequent agreements. PTAs 
steadily increase in average size. So, it is possible that an effect over time is not captured by this overall 
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view. To widen the perspective, I will look at the agreements chronologically and study relative change for 
individual countries in the Americas and Europe.
Figure 6: WTO X Provisions Overview
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Source: author’s own research.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show a comparison of the number of WTO X and WTO Plus, respectively, provisions 
in agreements signed by the EU and by EFTA. For WTO X provisions, an upward trend is visible. This means 
that the number of instances representing a broadening of the WTO agenda (i.e., WTO X provisions) has 
been increasing over time. It also appears as if this happens at quite a similar pace for the EU and for EFTA. 
For WTO Plus provision, the effect is much less clear. The overall trend seems to be an increase as well, but 
the evidence is ambiguous at best. The variation for WTO Plus provisions is much bigger than for WTO X 
provision. Therefore, it is unclear if there is a general trend of copying for WTO Plus provisions. If a trend 
can be established, then it is an increase in WTO Plus topics over the years. This trend is marked more 
clearly for the EU than it is for EFTA.
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Figure 7: WTO Plus Chronology Europe
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Figure 8: WTO X Chronology Europe
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The same comparison for the Americas is provided in Figure 9 and 10. The resulting picture is similar. As 
far as WTO X topic areas are concerned, all three countries used them in similar ways. A difference to the 
European case is that no clear upward or downward trend can be seen. For WTO X provisions, the data 
Source: author’s own research.
Source: author’s own research.
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points and accordingly the trend lines are much more dispersed. They clearly do not permit to draw any 
conclusions on a general trend.
Figure 9: WTO Plus Chronology Americas
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Figure 10: WTO X Chronology Americas
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Source: author’s own research.
Source: author’s own research.
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The observations made so far are the following: The way WTO X provisions are added to PTAs shows some 
resemblance for different signatories in the same region. This is true for Europe and there is some indica-
tion for the Americas, too. This hints at a process based on templates. Interestingly, this appears not to be 
the case for WTO Plus provisions. In Europe, we also see a general tendency towards an ever expanding 
trade agenda vis-à-vis the WTO (i.e., WTO X provisions), whereas for the Americas this is not the case. 
Although these are interesting preliminary results, a general word of caution about any inference from 
the trend lines in Figures 7 to 10 needs to be voiced: They are all very rough interpolations with a slightly 
better (but still relatively weak) fit for Europe. Although they give an interesting glimpse of what could be a 
genuine phenomenon, a more in-depth analysis is necessary to confirm any generalization based on these 
graphs.
It appears intuitive that WTO X provisions are more likely to follow a regional template than WTO Plus pro-
visions. For WTO Plus provisions, there is another obvious actor to look at (i.e., the WTO) that offers itself as 
an alternative guiding light. The margin of maneuver is also more restricted. There might be disagreements 
what is permissible to put into a PTA. With quasi-universal membership, WTO topics are also more ‘global-
ized’ in that sense and were already subject to multilateral negotiations.
The greater consistency between EU and EFTA agreements comes not as a surprise. EFTA did closely follow 
EU agreements up to the end of the 1990s. When the de facto moratorium on PTAs was put into place by 
the Commission in 1999, EFTA became more independent with its agreements and especially its choice of 
partners (author’s interviews 20106). This de facto moratorium was kept in place until 2006, while exempt-
ing the good neighborhood policy (Elsig 2001, 2007; Evenett 2007; Meunier 2007). Interestingly, there is 
little change detectable before and after the moratorium. It is difficult to come to firm conclusions because 
of the small number of cases and, even more importantly, the varying time lag between the negotiation 
and conclusion of PTAs.
5.  Vertical Templates: Environment, Anti-Corruption and Social Cooperation 
The previous section attempted to study regional effects while searching for horizontal template transfer 
using aggregated data. The results bear important hints but are at best only indicators of what might be 
going on under the hood. This section is an attempt to lift up that hood and have a peek at the engine that 
is beneath. This will also help to confirm or falsify the findings from the previous section. It will also be a 
first step of mapping PTA provisions more detailed. Although it is beyond the scope of this working paper 
to do so on a large scale for many countries, we might nevertheless gain some insights when focusing on 
specific WTO X provisions for the EU and the U.S..
The focus of this closer look at PTA provisions is in part determined by the findings of the previous section. 
The results suggest that WTO X provisions are more likely to follow a specific pattern. Therefore, I will focus 
6 Unstructured interviews with EFTA negotiators in Geneva 3 May and 3 June 2010 and a Swiss trade official in Bern 
19 May 2010.
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on three areas that are WTO X issues. For the U.S., there is only a limited amount of WTO X provisions that 
can be studied and the overlap with the EU is even smaller (based on the list of Horn et al. 2010). The first 
topic I want to look at is Environment. Both the U.S. and the EU often have environmental provisions in their 
PTAs whereas environmental issues are not systematically and formally addressed by the WTO agreements 
(although some disputes led to controversial rulings concerning environmental issues). Horn, Mavroidis 
and Sapir also qualify environmental provisions as a WTO X issue (2010).
The issues for the second and third topic are only found in U.S. or EU PTAs, respectively. This will allow 
comparing the evolution of provisions that are unlikely to suffer from ‘cross-contamination’ from other 
agreements. The two areas in question are Anti-Corruption Measures, which are unique to U.S. PTAs and 
Cultural Cooperation, which can only be found in EU agreements. Both issues are clearly not part of the 
WTO agreements and hence fall into the WTO X category (Abott 2001; Horn et al. 2010).
In order to analyze these topic areas, I will use a more general quantitative proxy followed by a qualitative 
analysis. I will start by looking at rough quantifications of provisions about the environment in EU and U.S. 
PTAs. Methodologically, this approach is based on and extends the previous analysis. The first (quantita-
tive) measure is the size of these specific provisions. It is plausible to assume that a template would leave 
a track that is detectable in such a cursory view. In a second step, I will turn to the actual content of envi-
ronmental provisions. Finally, I will repeat the same analysis for anti-corruption provisions in U.S. PTAs and 
provisions on cultural cooperation in EU agreements.
I base this analysis on the same subset of agreements as previously, but this time I will focus only on agree-
ments that were signed by the EU or the U.S. (see the appendix for a full list of the agreements used in this 
part of the analysis). In total, I included 37 PTAs. 13 were signed by the U.S. and 24 by the EU. They stretch 
over a time span from 1963 to 2012 (1963 to 2010 for the EU and 1985 to 2012 for the U.S.), but almost all 
of them were signed in the first decade of the 21st century. This accurately reflects the proliferation that 
only started in that period (Aggarwal 2013: 90). 12 out of 13 U.S. agreements contained a specific environ-
mental provision and 13 out of 24 EU agreements did so as well. Some of the early agreements are obvi-
ously not part of the surge in PTAs discussed in this study (notably the U.S. agreement with Israel from 1985 
and an agreement between Turkey and the EU from 1963) and are therefore not included in the graphics. 
Although they are notified to the WTO as PTAs, I did not include the various enlargement agreements by 
the EU in order to avoid a bias through agreements that are much more political in nature than the stan-
dard PTA. I also excluded NAFTA because of its timing (1994) and its much more comprehensive scope.
If we compare the environmental provisions in EU and U.S. PTAs on their most basic level, we can already 
see a differentiating pattern. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the length (measured in words) of these provi-
sions plotted across time. Length is a good proxy for similarity as typically the same wording is used and 
provisions with the same number of words are usually very similar. This was also confirmed by the in-depth 
analysis that will follow for each provision. I decided against conducting a normalization of numbers rela-
tive to the length of the agreements although such a weighting could be suggested since, first, the focus 
is on the content of the provision. It would not make sense to say the length of the respective provisions 
followed the length of the agreement, but it is rather the other way round. Even if the template gets longer 
because the agreements get longer, it is still the template changing which is the focus of this study. Second, 
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the in-depth analysis of the actual text will show if random non-template additions are made. So there is 
a built-in safeguard. Third, as we will see, the only doubts which will remain after the qualitative analysis 
are on the EU provisions (due to the lack of detectable pattern). However, since this trend can be found in 
both cases, provisions in question were not used in the latest EU agreements, and no other pattern could 
be detected, weights are unlikely to change the results.
While the EU appears to produce provisions quite erratically as far as their length is concerned, the U.S. 
seems to have steadily expanded the content over the years. At best one could argue that the EU used 
these provisions between 2000 and 2005 and then (with the notable exception of one big outlier) stopped 
using them. However, this argument is not very convincing as several agreements were signed by the EU 
during that period without any environmental provisions. Admittedly, the number of cases for the U.S. is 
relatively small and this rough visual approach can only be indicative for a general trend again. At the same 
time, the level of variation shows that the U.S. is not necessarily working off a template how it is usually 
claimed. If the U.S. does, the template evolves over time and it is very malleable, closer to Davis’ minimalist 
understanding of templates (Davis 2009: 27).
In order to confirm these findings, it is useful to look more closely at the changes over time, comparing 
agreements with their immediate predecessors. It is slightly problematic to look at specific years of coming 
into force and to assume a clean-cut chronology. Agreements have widely varying exploration phases and 
negotiation cycles. A direct and specific content comparison is likely to reveal if this distorts the results too 
much. It is also reasonable to assume that in most cases these provisions still reflect at least somehow the 
mood of the involved capitals during the last years of negotiation.
Figure 11: Size of Environmental Provisions in EU PTAs
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Figure 12: Size of Environmental Provisions in U.S. PTAs
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When looking at the environmental provisions of the EU, the findings of the rough analysis are confirmed. 
With one exception, these provisions are stating quite general principles. They often contain a list of spe-
cific environmental questions to be addressed, but some provisions never reach that level of specificity. 
Chronologically, there is no clearly detectable pattern. The enumeration of areas covered (e.g., water man-
agement, nuclear safety etc.) appears to be rewritten from case to case. There are similar topics that come 
up, but not in a systematic way over time. Sometimes the list of topics does not make it into the agreement 
at all. Only the agreement of the Forum of the Caribbean Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States 
(CARIFORUM agreement), contains precise rules, procedures and definitions on environmental protection 
(the 2008 outlier). If there is a pattern, it has not been developing over time. The EU seems to follow a 
case by case approach. A comparison of the agreements signed with Middle Eastern and North African 
countries shows many overlaps, for example. However, even there is a non-neglectable variation. At best, 
we could argue that concerning the EU, there are some regional patterns that emerge, but these provisions 
are re-negotiated for every partner on a case-by-case basis.
In U.S. agreements very few changes of environmental provisions were undertaken up to the agreement 
with Singapore in 2004. Most changes are ‘diplomatic cosmetics.’ They might have meaning to diplomats, 
but would probably not be considered by a lawyer as making the difference between a fluffy wish-list and a 
hard and enforceable provision (e.g., replacing ‘strive for’ with ‘ensure that’ or the addition or the removal 
of a section on ‘objectives,’ respectively). In the Singapore agreement, a set of new subparagraphs were 
added: Institutional Arrangements, Opportunities for Public Participation, Environmental Cooperation and 
Consultations. Most of them remained in subsequent agreements. In later agreements, some additional 
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provisions on enforcement were added, some of the previous ones dropped (and taken up again later), 
but most remained. In 2009, the agreement with the most extensive environmental clause was signed 
with Peru. It includes the creation of an environmental affairs council, the clauses on biodiversity and an 
extended annex. Two nearly identical agreements (except for the appendices) with Colombia and Panama 
followed in 2011, whereas the most recent agreement studied (with South Korea) appears to be a slightly 
slimmed down version of them.
The Singapore agreement has a special place in the list of U.S. PTAs. It was considered to be a template 
for future agreements as it was seen as the first one in a series of new agreements (author’s interviews 
Washington DC 2009;7 Weintraub 2004: 89). A second event probably spurred WTO X provisions in the U.S. 
template, especially concerning the environment. In 2007, a deadlock was overcome in the U.S. Congress 
with the so-called “May 10 compromise” (USTR 2007) what is also an excellent example to illustrate the 
Congress’ role in introducing these prima facie non-trade issues into trade agreements and on how the 
trade agenda (and the template) were extended. When the Democrats took over control in Congress in 
2007, the Bush administration was facing a legislative that was much more critical towards free trade 
than the previous one. In fact, the electoral base favoring FTAs started to crumble already earlier (Destler 
2007: 2). Four months of negotiations with the USTR ensued, resulting in the May 10 agreement. With this 
compromise, labor standards and environmental provisions were to be introduced into trade agreements 
(namely for the negotiations with South Korea, Colombia and Panama, which were ongoing at that time). 
According to the New York Times (2007), “officials in Washington predicted that the agreements effect [...] 
could be a template for all trade deals, including a possible worldwide accord.” The May 10 Agreement is 
neither a drastic rupture, nor came it as a surprise. The Chile and Singapore PTAs already saw the introduc-
tion of non-trade measures that proved to be sticky. As Weintraub argues, this “reinforced the certainty 
that once non-trade issues enter into U.S. trade agreements, they take on a life of their own in later agree-
ments” (Weintraub 2004: 90).
When studying environmental provisions there is a ‘contamination’ issue. There is a flurry of international 
agreements that regulate environmental questions (see, e.g., Marceau 2001 on so-called Multilateral 
Environment Agreements (MEA)). Therefore, I looked for a WTO X topic area that is unique to each of the 
two actors. The only good candidate for the U.S. was found in anti-corruption provisions. These provisions 
cannot be found in EU agreements (Horn et al. 2010). They are not part of the WTO corpus of laws (Abott 
2001). Traditionally, the U.S. was a driving force behind the push to make anti-corruption legislation an 
international issue during the 1990s and, moreover, this topic has already been of domestic importance in 
the U.S. since the late 1970s. Anti-corruption is one WTO X topic that is covered systematically by the U.S., 
but not at all by the EU in PTAs (Horn et al. 2010:1578). 10 out of the 13 U.S. agreements included in this 
analysis contained a specific chapter or paragraph on anti-corruption measures. The only agreement that 
did not was the one signed with Israel in 1985 – a special case, not least because it preceded the next one 
by almost 30 years.
7 Unstructured interview with former US trade negotiator Washington DC, 4 November 2009.
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Figure 13: Size of Anti-Corruption Provisions in U.S. PTAs
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Source: author’s own research.
Again, I will start by looking at the development on an abstract level by comparing the length of the provi-
sions in question. Consistent with the previous findings we find the first anti-corruption provision in the 
PTA with Singapore. An agreement with Chile that came into force the same year (2004) did not contain 
such a provision. However, in 2006, the length of the anti-corruption provisions jumps up to a level where 
it appears to remain the subsequent years. In order to see what this pattern means for the content of these 
provisions, we need to zoom in again on the actual wording.
When it comes to content, the anti-corruption provisions in the first pre-2006 U.S. agreements are very 
general and vague. They appear to be declarations of principles in the first place. The new element that has 
been introduced in 2006 was a precise language, defining what under what circumstances is to be consid-
ered corruption. It is reminiscent of the legal language of domestic judicial rules. On top of that, an article 
is added that offers general definitions of the key terms. From 2006 onwards, the changes are to a large 
extent what I previously called ‘diplomatic cosmetics.’ There are some one-off additions and eliminations 
like, for example, a list of reference agreements.
To conduct the same analysis for an issue that is unique to EU PTAs, I will look at provisions on cultural 
cooperation. This issue area is not ideal for a comparison as it is probably the one with the weakest link to 
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trade.8 The problem is to find a WTO X topic that is not covered by U.S. PTAs and that is present in a large 
number of EU PTAs, but this issue area is the best available option. Figure 12 shows a similar pattern to EU 
environmental provisions, or more precisely, the absence of any pattern. The most remarkable aspect is 
probably that none of the agreements signed after 2005 included provisions on cultural cooperation.
Figure 14: Size of Anti-Corruption Provisions in U.S. PTAs
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Source: author’s own research.
If we look at the actual provision, the previous findings are reproduced for the EU. There is no pattern over 
time. One gets the impression that even provisions of little value in terms of bindingness and enforceability 
are tailored to each case. Sometimes articles on cultural cooperation include audiovisual arts, sometimes 
they do not. Some articles are very similar without being identical (e.g., Israel and Palestine) and some geo-
graphic groups have cultural cooperation clauses built around a common core (e.g., North Africa, Balkans). 
If there are templates, they are limited to specific regions or groups of countries. In general, these clauses 
are very generic, do not contain enforceable rules and appear to be to at large extent declarations of intent 
and of a symbolic nature. 
From the study of the three WTO X areas (Environment, Anti-Corruption and Cultural Cooperation), it ap-
pears as if there are three potential patterns of how templates are used vertically and developed over time. 
The first is the European way: EU provisions are tailor-made for partners. If some kind of template exists 
8 Cultural cooperation in EU PTAs are very soft provisions. They should not be confused with more trade relevant 
aspects of trade in audio-visual and cultural goods.
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at all, it is within specific groups of countries. The U.S., on the other hand, appears to work off a template. 
However, this template is very flexible and there are two ways how this template changes and evolves. 
Its environmental provisions have changed incrementally and grown organically (i.e., in small steps, one 
addition building on the previous one). For the anti-corruption provisions, on the other hand, changes hap-
pened disruptively at one point in time. It is important to note that for the U.S., even the existence of an 
allegedly ‘rigid’ template did not prevent new additions and their persistence in subsequent agreements. 
It should be equally emphasized that I did not notice a similar pattern for the EU for all its agreements over 
time, but that similar processes can be observed for groups of countries. Generalizations, however, are 
difficult because of the small number of cases.
6.  Conclusion
This conclusion has two main parts. In the first part, I will summarize the results from the previous sections 
in order to provide an overview of the various findings and to put them into a coherent context. In the 
second part, I will speculate about possible explanations, how differences can be explained, what we have 
learned about the use of templates and what all this means for a potential future research agenda on the 
content of PTAs.
The various approaches I have used led to some new insights on the distinct ways provisions in PTAs evolve 
and diffuse. First, there is the distinction between WTO X rules and WTO Plus rules. They appear to be in-
tegrated into PTAs in different ways and their inclusion is subject to different patterns. The different nature 
of WTO X and WTO Plus provisions does not come as a surprise. It is reasonable to assume that the WTO is 
still seen as the best venue to deepen its own agenda. Second, PTAs, on the other hand, offer a possibility to 
liberalize in new areas, where negotiations would have to start from zero within the WTO. The EU and the 
U.S. approach WTO X and WTO Plus provisions differently. These results appear to partially contradict Horn, 
Mavroidis and Sapir (2010). Third, we see signs of regional patterns that could be the echo of a diffusion 
process (i.e., horizontal use of templates), however, due to the method used in this working paper there 
is a lot of noise. If there is a diffusion process it is clearer for the EU than for the U.S. Fourth, at least for 
the provisions analyzed in this paperm we find different evolutive patterns for the vertical use (i.e., for one 
signatory across time) of templates. While the EU has a case by case approach, the U.S. seems to be more 
systematic. Environmental provisions grew gradually in size and extent while anti-corruption provisions 
jumped to a more sophisticated level. Fifth, despite the claim that the U.S. uses a simple template with little 
leeway in negotiations, the template clearly changes over time. These findings are summarized in Table 2.
Equally interesting is the fact that the findings in this paper appear to contradict some claims by Horn, 
Mavroidis and Sapir (2010). This points in the direction of future analyses to explain the differences be-
tween the U.S. and the EU. As a rough general rule, the U.S. appears to use about the same amount of 
WTO Plus rules as the EU. However, it has a tendency to use more WTO X provisions than the EU in its PTAs 
(although this seems to contradict conventional wisdom). One possible explanation is that the language of 
U.S. agreements is more legally precise and that they are more likely to mention issues, even if they do not 
necessarily include a specific article for this issue. If this is the case, they would show up in an automated 
analysis, but not in a more qualitative assessment as done by Mavroidis in his legal analysis. This would 
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The level to which templates are used remains somehow unclear. Too many confounding variables are pres-
ent. There are indications that PTA provisions in EFTA agreements are modeled after the EU agreements. 
However, even here evidence is not very strong so far. For the U.S., Chile and Mexico, the result is at best 
ambiguous. WTO X provisions appear to be transmitted regionally more easily. Again, this is not surprising, 
as we would expect the margin of maneuver for WTO Plus provisions to be much more restricted legally. 
Moreover, the ‘easier’ parts were already negotiated within the WTO, so only more contentious and often 
more technical questions are left on the table (the ‘Plus’ part). Topics apparently evolve and new ideas are 
added, but the extent to which this happens across borders needs to be investigated further.
The most interesting findings are perhaps the different patterns of how these provisions evolve. They seem 
to confirm that there is a vertical template, but that the template is quite modular. The three distinctive 
patterns are gradual (U.S. for environment), jumps (U.S. for anti-corruption) and case by case (EU for envi-
ronment and cultural cooperation). These patterns are confirmed by a chronological in-depth comparison 
of these provisions. Further research could look into possible reasons for this. One initial speculation is 
that the EU as an aggregation of various national interests has different priorities. These priorities will be 
bubbling to the surface at the negotiation table, depending on the partner sitting on the other side. The 
U.S. might pursue a much more targeted strategy. The difference we see between the way anti-corruption 
and environmental provisions developed suggests that the U.S. is still prone to external influence (anti-
corruption would be the U.S.’ own topic, environment is much more internationalized).
Last but not least, it is interesting that particularly the U.S. appears to be very flexible on PTA provisions 
despite the claim that it is just following a template. That means that the partners at the negotiation table 
have more room for deals than is typically admitted. This in turn opens the door for influence even when 
facing a considerable power imbalance.
The nature of legalization and complexification of PTAs can take different pathways. The final result remains 
the same. It also shows that it is almost inherent to the system. Different actors with different approaches 
end up at a similar point. Power imbalances appear only to explain a limited part of these developments. 
The process seems to be neither conscious nor directed. Meanwhile, the system continues to become 
more complex and legalized.
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Table 2 Summary of Findings
European Union United States
WTO X Uses more, but legally inflated 
(qualitative assessment Horn et al. 
2010)
Uses slightly less than U.S. 
(quantitative assessment author’s 
own data)
Few provisions (qualitative 
assessment Horn et al. 2010)
More WTO X provisions than EU 
(quantitative assessment author’s 
own data)
Trend WTO X Increase Ambiguous/Absent
Regional templates WTO X 
(horizontal)
EU template used EFTA Ambiguous if U.S. agreement is used 
in Americas/Not used
WTO Plus (vertical) Uses less than U.S. (qualitative 
assessment Horn et al. 2010)
Uses slightly more than U.S.
Uses more (qualitative assessment 
Horn et al. 2010)
Uses slightly less than U.S.
Trend WTO Plus (vertical) Ambiguous No
Regional template WTO Plus 
(horizontal)
Ambiguous No
Internal consistency (vertical) Low High
Over all evolution (vertical) Random or regional patterns only Steady, consistent
Environment (vertical) Every case different Expanding agenda, consistent
Anti-corruption (vertical) Not available Expanding agenda, consistent
Cultural cooperation (vertical) Every case different Not available
Source: author’s own research.
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Appendix: Agreements
Chile Australia 06 Mar 2009
Chile Peru 01 Jul 1998
Chile Mercosur 01 Oct 1996
Chile Central America 15 Feb 2002
Chile Korea 01 Apr 2004
Chile Canada 05 Jul 1997
Chile Mexico 01 Aug 1999
Chile Costa Rica 15 Feb 2002
Chile El Salvador 01 Jun 2002
Chile China 01 Oct 2006
Chile Japan 03 Sep 2007
Chile Panama 07 Mar 2008
Chile Colombia 08 May 2009
EU OCTs 01 Jan 1971
EU Serbia 08 Jan 2010
EU San Marino 10 Mar 2006
EU Syrian Arab Republic 01 Jul 1977
EU Andorra 01 Jul 1991
EU Turkey 01 Jan 1996
EU Faeroe Islands 01 Jan 1997
EU Palestinian Authority 01 Jul 1997
EU Tunisia 01 Mar 1998
EU South Africa 01 Jan 2000
EU Morocco 01 Mar 2000
EU Israel 01 Jun 2000
EU Mexico 01 Jul 2000
EU Macedonia, FYR 01 Jun 2001
EU Croatia 01 Mar 2002
EU Jordan 01 May 2002
EU Chile 01 Feb 2003
EU Lebanon 01 Mar 2003
EU Egypt, Arab Rep. 01 Jun 2004
EU Chile 01 Mar 2005
EU Algeria 01 Sep 2005
EU Albania 01 Dec 2006
EU Cote d’Ivoire 01 Jan 2009
EU Cameroon 01 Oct 2009
EU Montenegro 01 Jan 2008
EU Bosnia and Herzegovina 01 Jul 2008
EU CARIFORUM 01 Nov 2008
EFTA Canada 01 Jul 2009
EFTA Turkey 01 Apr 1992
EFTA Israel 01 Jan 1993
EFTA Palestinian Authority 01 Jul 1999
EFTA Morocco 01 Dec 1999
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EFTA Mexico 01 Jul 2000
EFTA Macedonia, FYR 01 Jan 2001
EFTA Croatia 01 Jan 2002
EFTA Jordan 01 Jan 2002
EFTA Singapore 01 Jan 2003
EFTA Chile 01 Dec 2004
EFTA Tunisia 01 Jun 2005
EFTA Korea, Rep. 01 Sep 2006
EFTA Lebanon 01 Jan 2007
EFTA Egypt, Arab Rep. 01 Aug 2007
EFTA SACU 01 May 2008
Mexico Nicaragua 01 Jul 1998
Mexico Bolivia 07 Jun 2010
Mexico Columbia 15 Aug 2011
Mexico Costa Rica 01 Jan 1995
Mexico El Salvador/Guatemala 15 Mar/01 Jun 2001
Mexico Israel 01 Jun 2000
Mexico Japan 01 Apr 2005
Mexico Uruguay 15 Jul 2004
United States Israel 19 Aug 1985
United States Jordan 17 Dec 2001
United States Chile 01 Jan 2004
United States Singapore 01 Jan 2004
United States Australia 01 Jan 2005
United States Morocco 01 Jan 2006
United States Bahrain 01 Aug 2006
United States Oman 01 Jan 2009
United States Peru 01 Feb 2009
United States CAFTA 01 Mar 2006 (+later)
United States Korea 15 Mar 2012
United States Panama 31 Oct 2012
Source: author’s own research.
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